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Why were the NSG Part 2 Guidelines created?

The NSG Part 2 Guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material and technology (also known as the ‘Dual-Use Guidelines’) were created by NSG participants between 1991 and 1992 after it became apparent that export control provisions then in force had not prevented one state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) from pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme, which later prompted United Nations (UN) Security Council action. A large part of this clandestine nuclear weapons programme effort had been to acquire dual-use items not covered by the NSG Guidelines and then use these items to build Trigger List items.

By developing the NSG Part 2 Guidelines, the NSG further demonstrated its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation by ensuring that dual-use items were controlled to ensure their non-explosive use. These items would, however, continue to be available for peaceful nuclear activities that are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, as well as for other industrial activities where they would not contribute to nuclear proliferation. The Dual-Use Guidelines were published as Part 2 of the IAEA’s Information Circular INFCIRC/254 in 1992, and the original Guidelines published in 1978 became Part 1 of INFCIRC/254.

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Guidelines for nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254, Part 1)

Guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software, and related technology (INFCIRC/254, Part 2)

NSG Chair

 Claudia Santos 100x100px Ambassador
Ms Claudia SANTOS (Brazil)
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